Q1Write about FISCAL CONSOLIDATION measures IN INDIA?
Fiscal consolidation is adopting the strategies that help in reducing fiscal deficit. These measures vary
from reducing expenditure to collecting more revenue.
Government does this by adhering to prudent policies as follows:
I By Reducing expenditure
1. reducing imports- by increasing import duty on certain items
2. reducing subsidies which form a substantial part of budget, eg deregulating petrol prices
3. though imprudent, but by cutting capital expenditure as there is little scope in cutting revenue expenditure.
4. Indigenisation of the defence sector and recovering the black money
II By Increasing Revenue
1. increase in disinvestment targets
2. targeting for more tax collection either by widening the base or by increasing rates OR by in introduing tax reforms
3. investment in sectors with high returns
Fiscal consolidation is a weapon that to curtail inflation but over use of it could result in crippling the economy.so a moderate fiscal deficit is the panacea which would help in putting the economy on the path of growth without increase in the inflation.
Q2.write about the NEW RULES BY MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS WITH RESPECT TO GRANTING FOREST CLEARANCES.?
Through a quick series of notifications, the Union environment ministry has eased rules for mining, roads, power and irrigation projects and other industrial sectors. It has diluted a host of regulations related to environment, forest and tribal rights. The dilutions of green norms include,
a) Coal companies expansion without mandatory public hearing and clearance in clusters for nearby mines, instead of separate approvals,
b) Wildlife nod delinked from forest clearance for areas around wildlife zones
c) States’ powers removed, to put additional safeguards
d) Tribal rights diluted, favoring prospecting miners
e) Miners not in compliance for over five years to also get approvals
f) Forests can be cut even before final clearance for projects such as roads and irrigation canals is obtained.
g) NBW without independent experts, to clear projects
h) Plan to dilute National Green Tribunal’s powers
i) Ban on new industries in critically polluted industrial areas lifted; pollution index-based moratoriums stopped
The doors have thus been thrown wide open for a laissez faire exploitation of natural resources and rampant damage to the environment for which the nation, especially future generations, would have to pay a massive cost.
The new rules notified by the Ministry of Environment on granting forest clearances to various development projects seem to have serious trade offs with biodiversity conservation and tribal welfare efforts.
The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic
Corridor will increase socioeconomic development and trade in South
Asia. The initiative seeks to improve connectivity and infrastructure,
energy resources, agriculture, and trade and investment. It will connect
India’s Northeast, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Chinese province of
Yunnan through a network of roads, railways, waterways, and airways
under a proper regulatory framework. The current focus of BCIM talks is
on an inter-regional road network. This makes sense, as roads are the
cheapest route of trade.The BCIM Economic Corridor is a
modern version of the Silk Road, and a revision of the 1999 Track II
Kunming initiative between BCIM countries. It is planned to run from
China’s Kunming province to Kolkata in India, and link Mandalay in
Myanmar and Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh. BCIM initiatives have
gained momentum since Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India and
the conclusion of the first official meeting of the joint study group of
the BCIM Economic Corridor on 19 December 2013.
In 2005, trade between Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar
was 7.99 per cent of world trade. Since then, trade has grown both
within the region and with outside countries, driven by China (and to a
lesser degree, India).
Together, the BCIM countries account for 9 per cent of the global landmass and 40 per cent of the global population. The combined population of India’s Northeast, China’s Yunnan province, Bangladesh, and Myanmar is 440 million. Intra-regional trade among BCIM member states amounted to 5 per cent of total BCIM trade in 2012, as opposed to ASEAN, where 35 per cent of total trade is intra-regional. The BCIM Corridor will allow all four countries to exploit existing complementarities in trade — in terms of both sectors and products. Myanmar is a primary goods exporter and has abundant cheap labour. India has positioned itself as a leading services exporter. China is the largest manufacturing exporter in the world; and Bangladesh, like many other South Asian countries, engages in both services export and low-end manufactured goods.
Given the immense conventional and renewable energy resources in the region, one aspiration of the Corridor is collaboration in the power sector. BCIM sub-regional cooperation can capitalise on hydrocarbons in Bangladesh, hydro-electric and mineral resources in Northeast India, natural gas reserves in Myanmar, and coal reserves in East Indian states like Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and China’s Yunnan province. The potential for Northeast India to export energy to power-starved Bangladesh under the auspices of BCIM’s institutional structure is particularly strong. Energy cooperation among BCIM countries will have implications for China, the largest consumer of energy. India’s engagement with Myanmar will contribute to India’s energy security as India is currently heavily dependent on Gulf oil imports. Myanmar will also be able to engage in export diversification, as it is currently over-reliant on China and Thailand for energy exports.
The BCIM Corridor aims to promote trade and investment in the region through trade facilitation measures and greater participation of the public and private sectors. It is likely to encourage further interest by Chinese and Indian firms in Myanmar. An upgrade of the 312 kilometre stretch of Stilwell Road, which connects Northeast India with Yunnan through northern Myanmar, could lower transportation costs between India and China by 30 per cent and escalate already growing Sino–Indian trade through the BCIM Corridor. Yunnan and West Bengal can cooperate in sectors like agro-processing. The fact that the capitals of the two provinces, Kunming and Kolkata, are the two ends of the BCIM Corridor only adds to prospects for greater exchange.
Bangladesh, with which India shares its longest border, could connect the Northeast to the rest of India. Access to the large Indian and Chinese markets will make Bangladesh an attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Bangladesh can also benefit from connecting to China through Myanmar and becoming a commercial hub for South and Southeast Asia. Indian goods will also benefit from access to large markets in East Asia through Myanmar. The BCIM corridor, by creating tradingopportunities for Myanmar, will help the country integrate into regional supply chains. In fact, the Dawei port in Myanmar, thanks to its strategic geographical position, could be a means to increase the country’s international integration.
Empirical studies suggest that improving transport infrastructure could have a direct bearing on the social and economic development of other sub-regions in Asia — for example, the Greater Mekong sub-region. Given the historical and cultural commonalities, as well as institutional overlaps, between the BCIM and the GMS, the same result is expected in the former as well.
The BCIM Corridor is a win-win arrangement. The linkages of transport, energy, and telecommunications networks will enable the region to emerge as a thriving economic belt that will promote social development of communities along the Corridor. To date, South Asia has not come close to enjoying the same economic success that East Asia has reaped. BCIM might well be the game changer that South Asia needs.
These “bases” are found nowhere in the Indian Ocean. The most telling evidence is that the PLA Navy has been conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for five years without any bases of their own. Jean-Paul Adam, the Seychelles Foreign Affairs Minister, announced in December 2011 that his country had invited China to set up a military base in his country, but the Chinese Ministry of Defense only responded that the Chinese side would “consider” replenishment or port calls in the Seychelles and other countries.
China has only two purposes in the Indian Ocean: economic gains and the security of Sea lines of Communication (SLOC). The first objective is achieved through commercial interactions with littoral states. For the second purpose, the Chinese Navy has, since the end of 2008, joined international military efforts in combating piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia. In fact, the only thing justifiable in the “string of pearls” theory is that it underlines the growing importance, even then, of the Indian Ocean for China’s ever-expanding national interests, especially in terms of energy import. Nowadays China is securing its energy needs from all parts of the world, but the Middle East still prevails as the most important source. By the end of 2013, China had become the largest trader and the largest oil importer in the world. The Indian Ocean, and hence the security of SLOCs from Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, to the Malacca Strait, is thus vitally important for China.
Two countries are most important for China’s freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean: the U.S. and India. The U.S. is the only country that has the full capabilities to control the chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and cut off the SLOCs all the way to China, but it is unlikely to exercise such capabilities, unless, perhaps, in an all-out war with China. Even during the Cold War neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union endeavored to cut off any SLOCs in the world. Besides, the SLOCs are life-lines for all states. Cutting off China’s SLOCs will also affect U.S. allies of Japan, ROK and Australia. So long as Sino-American relations remain manageable, such a worst-case scenario is unlikely to occur.
Fiscal consolidation is adopting the strategies that help in reducing fiscal deficit. These measures vary
from reducing expenditure to collecting more revenue.
Government does this by adhering to prudent policies as follows:
I By Reducing expenditure
1. reducing imports- by increasing import duty on certain items
2. reducing subsidies which form a substantial part of budget, eg deregulating petrol prices
3. though imprudent, but by cutting capital expenditure as there is little scope in cutting revenue expenditure.
4. Indigenisation of the defence sector and recovering the black money
II By Increasing Revenue
1. increase in disinvestment targets
2. targeting for more tax collection either by widening the base or by increasing rates OR by in introduing tax reforms
3. investment in sectors with high returns
Fiscal consolidation is a weapon that to curtail inflation but over use of it could result in crippling the economy.so a moderate fiscal deficit is the panacea which would help in putting the economy on the path of growth without increase in the inflation.
Q2.write about the NEW RULES BY MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS WITH RESPECT TO GRANTING FOREST CLEARANCES.?
Through a quick series of notifications, the Union environment ministry has eased rules for mining, roads, power and irrigation projects and other industrial sectors. It has diluted a host of regulations related to environment, forest and tribal rights. The dilutions of green norms include,
a) Coal companies expansion without mandatory public hearing and clearance in clusters for nearby mines, instead of separate approvals,
b) Wildlife nod delinked from forest clearance for areas around wildlife zones
c) States’ powers removed, to put additional safeguards
d) Tribal rights diluted, favoring prospecting miners
e) Miners not in compliance for over five years to also get approvals
f) Forests can be cut even before final clearance for projects such as roads and irrigation canals is obtained.
g) NBW without independent experts, to clear projects
h) Plan to dilute National Green Tribunal’s powers
i) Ban on new industries in critically polluted industrial areas lifted; pollution index-based moratoriums stopped
The doors have thus been thrown wide open for a laissez faire exploitation of natural resources and rampant damage to the environment for which the nation, especially future generations, would have to pay a massive cost.
The new rules notified by the Ministry of Environment on granting forest clearances to various development projects seem to have serious trade offs with biodiversity conservation and tribal welfare efforts.
Q3. HOW BCIM Corridor can be a game changer for South Asian trade?
Together, the BCIM countries account for 9 per cent of the global landmass and 40 per cent of the global population. The combined population of India’s Northeast, China’s Yunnan province, Bangladesh, and Myanmar is 440 million. Intra-regional trade among BCIM member states amounted to 5 per cent of total BCIM trade in 2012, as opposed to ASEAN, where 35 per cent of total trade is intra-regional. The BCIM Corridor will allow all four countries to exploit existing complementarities in trade — in terms of both sectors and products. Myanmar is a primary goods exporter and has abundant cheap labour. India has positioned itself as a leading services exporter. China is the largest manufacturing exporter in the world; and Bangladesh, like many other South Asian countries, engages in both services export and low-end manufactured goods.
Given the immense conventional and renewable energy resources in the region, one aspiration of the Corridor is collaboration in the power sector. BCIM sub-regional cooperation can capitalise on hydrocarbons in Bangladesh, hydro-electric and mineral resources in Northeast India, natural gas reserves in Myanmar, and coal reserves in East Indian states like Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and China’s Yunnan province. The potential for Northeast India to export energy to power-starved Bangladesh under the auspices of BCIM’s institutional structure is particularly strong. Energy cooperation among BCIM countries will have implications for China, the largest consumer of energy. India’s engagement with Myanmar will contribute to India’s energy security as India is currently heavily dependent on Gulf oil imports. Myanmar will also be able to engage in export diversification, as it is currently over-reliant on China and Thailand for energy exports.
The BCIM Corridor aims to promote trade and investment in the region through trade facilitation measures and greater participation of the public and private sectors. It is likely to encourage further interest by Chinese and Indian firms in Myanmar. An upgrade of the 312 kilometre stretch of Stilwell Road, which connects Northeast India with Yunnan through northern Myanmar, could lower transportation costs between India and China by 30 per cent and escalate already growing Sino–Indian trade through the BCIM Corridor. Yunnan and West Bengal can cooperate in sectors like agro-processing. The fact that the capitals of the two provinces, Kunming and Kolkata, are the two ends of the BCIM Corridor only adds to prospects for greater exchange.
Bangladesh, with which India shares its longest border, could connect the Northeast to the rest of India. Access to the large Indian and Chinese markets will make Bangladesh an attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Bangladesh can also benefit from connecting to China through Myanmar and becoming a commercial hub for South and Southeast Asia. Indian goods will also benefit from access to large markets in East Asia through Myanmar. The BCIM corridor, by creating tradingopportunities for Myanmar, will help the country integrate into regional supply chains. In fact, the Dawei port in Myanmar, thanks to its strategic geographical position, could be a means to increase the country’s international integration.
Empirical studies suggest that improving transport infrastructure could have a direct bearing on the social and economic development of other sub-regions in Asia — for example, the Greater Mekong sub-region. Given the historical and cultural commonalities, as well as institutional overlaps, between the BCIM and the GMS, the same result is expected in the former as well.
The BCIM Corridor is a win-win arrangement. The linkages of transport, energy, and telecommunications networks will enable the region to emerge as a thriving economic belt that will promote social development of communities along the Corridor. To date, South Asia has not come close to enjoying the same economic success that East Asia has reaped. BCIM might well be the game changer that South Asia needs.
Q4.WRITE a note on The string of pearls and the Maritime Silk Road?
The phrase ‘String of Pearls’ was first used in 2005, in a
report entitled “Energy Futures in Asia” provided to U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.
It alleged that China was adopting a “string of pearls” strategy of
bases stretching from the Middle East to southern China. These “pearls”
were naval bases or electronic eavesdropping posts built by the Chinese
in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistani and Sri Lanka. The purpose was to
project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments.
Nine years have since elapsed. The phrase, or theory, still sticks in the international media and in some think tank reports.These “bases” are found nowhere in the Indian Ocean. The most telling evidence is that the PLA Navy has been conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for five years without any bases of their own. Jean-Paul Adam, the Seychelles Foreign Affairs Minister, announced in December 2011 that his country had invited China to set up a military base in his country, but the Chinese Ministry of Defense only responded that the Chinese side would “consider” replenishment or port calls in the Seychelles and other countries.
China has only two purposes in the Indian Ocean: economic gains and the security of Sea lines of Communication (SLOC). The first objective is achieved through commercial interactions with littoral states. For the second purpose, the Chinese Navy has, since the end of 2008, joined international military efforts in combating piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia. In fact, the only thing justifiable in the “string of pearls” theory is that it underlines the growing importance, even then, of the Indian Ocean for China’s ever-expanding national interests, especially in terms of energy import. Nowadays China is securing its energy needs from all parts of the world, but the Middle East still prevails as the most important source. By the end of 2013, China had become the largest trader and the largest oil importer in the world. The Indian Ocean, and hence the security of SLOCs from Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, to the Malacca Strait, is thus vitally important for China.
Two countries are most important for China’s freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean: the U.S. and India. The U.S. is the only country that has the full capabilities to control the chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and cut off the SLOCs all the way to China, but it is unlikely to exercise such capabilities, unless, perhaps, in an all-out war with China. Even during the Cold War neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union endeavored to cut off any SLOCs in the world. Besides, the SLOCs are life-lines for all states. Cutting off China’s SLOCs will also affect U.S. allies of Japan, ROK and Australia. So long as Sino-American relations remain manageable, such a worst-case scenario is unlikely to occur.
No comments:
Post a Comment